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Abstract
I document cyclical properties of aggregate measures of liabilities, equity, and leverage ratio in the U.S. financial
sector and those of credit spread. I find that (i) liabilities and equity are procyclical, leverage ratio is acyclical,
and credit spread is countercyclical, (ii) financial variables are three to ten times more volatile than output,
and (iii) financial variables lead the business cycle. I present a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
with profit maximizing banks where bank equity mitigates a moral hazard problem between banks and their
depositors. The driving sources of business cycles are shocks to bank equity as well as standard productivity
shocks. The model generates real and financial fluctuations consistent with the U.S. data. The model also
delivers some policy prescriptions about capital adequacy requirements of banks.
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1. Introduction
In the last century, most of the U.S. economy’s economic downturns are associated with banking crises.
These crises are serious not only due to the meltdown that they created in one specific sector of the economy
but because of the collapse that they caused in the whole economy.1 Hellmann et al. (2000) argue that moral
hazard in banking sector plays a crucial role in these crises.2 However, the macro literature studying the role
of the financial frictions in macroeconomic fluctuations emphasizes moral hazard in non-financial sector and
models financial intermediaries as passive players that simply transfer funds from savers to firms.3 This paper
builds on the idea that the financial intermediaries themselves could be an important source of business cycle
fluctuations since they are also dependent on external financing.4 Moreover, the behavior of balance sheet items
of financial intermediaries and how they interact with real variables over the business cycle have not been fully
explored in the literature. Most previous studies on financial frictions have not tried to match fluctuations in
both standard macro variables and aggregate financial variables at the same time. In this paper, I construct a
model with a financial sector capable of matching both real and financial fluctuations.
I first systematically document the business cycle properties of aggregate liabilities, aggregate equity, and
aggregate leverage ratio in the U.S. financial sector together with those of high yield bond spread (Baa-Aaa)
II thank seminar participants at the University of Maryland, 2010 Midwest Macroeconomics Meetings, Bilkent University,
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, 9th International Conference of Middle East Economic Association, and 10th International
Conference on Economic Modeling for helpful comments. I also would like to thank S. Boragan Aruoba, Sanjay K. Chugh, Pablo
N. D’Erasmo, Anton Korinek, John Shea, and Enes Sunel for very constructive suggestions. All remaining errors are mine.
∗E-mail: mimir@econ.umd.edu.
1Hellman et al. (2000) suggest that banking crises over the past two decades cost up to 40 percent of GDP. In particular, the
saving and loan crisis in the U.S. created losses estimated to be 3.2 percent of GDP.
2They also argue that abolishing formal deposit insurance systems does not solve this agency problem by itself. Kane (1989) and
Cole et al. (1995) note that banks select a risky asset portfolio which earns high profits if the gamble succeeds, however depositors
suffer from losses if it fails.
3Recent papers by Woodford and Curdia (2008), Gertler and Karadi (2010), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Brunnermeier and
Sannikov (2009) have attempted to model the financial sector as an active player.
4Carlson et al. (2008), Adrian and Shin (2009).
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using postwar data.5 The following stylized facts emerge from the empirical analysis: (1) Aggregate financial
leverage ratio and aggregate equity are three times more volatile than output, while credit spread is an order
of magnitude more volatile. (2) Aggregate liabilities and aggregate equity are procyclical, aggregate leverage
ratio is acyclical, and credit spread is countercyclical. (3) Aggregate leverage ratio, aggregate equity and credit
spread lead output by three, two and one quarters, respectively, while aggregate liabilities contemporaneously
move with output.
The model features two departures from an otherwise standard real business cycle framework in order to
have a model where balance sheet fluctuations of financial sector matter for real fluctuations. The first departure
is that I introduce a profit maximizing banking sector as in Gertler and Karadi (2010) – henceforth, GK. In
particular, banks borrow funds from households and their ability to borrow is limited due to a moral hazard
(costly enforcement) problem. This agency problem generates endogenous borrowing constraints for banks in
obtaining funds from households. The second departure is that I incorporate empirically-disciplined shocks
to bank net worth. These shocks capture disruptions in banks’ health that originate solely in the financial
sector. Following the recent literature, I interpret these shocks as loan losses, asset write-downs, reductions
in banks’ profits, or exogenous increases in the costs of financial intermediation.6 A complete model of the
determination of the fluctuations in net worth of banks is beyond the scope of this paper, because my goal is
to analyze the quantitative effects of movements in net worth of financial sector on business cycle fluctuations
of real and financial variables.7 Net worth shocks are transmitted to the real economy through their effects
on credit supply and thus investment decisions of non-financial firms –henceforth, firms. These two departures
generate the transmission mechanism by which fluctuations in bank equity induce sizeable movements in real
and financial variables.
There are three main results. First, standard productivity and net worth shocks quantitatively account for
almost all real and financial fluctuations in the data. Net worth shocks are transmitted to the real economy
through a purely financial channel (bank capital channel): if there were no moral hazard problem between
households and banks, hence no financial frictions, net worth shocks are not able to generate any fluctuations
in real variables. Second, the absence of either shock or the absence of the agency problem between banks and
households prevents the model from explaining the observed cyclical properties of real and financial variables
simultaneously. Third, net worth shocks induces sizeable fluctuations in real variables. In particular, these
shocks account for 29% of the fluctuations in output, 22% of the fluctuations in consumption, 72% of the
fluctuations in investment, and 84% of the fluctuations in labor hours. However, productivity shocks can only
partially explain the fluctuations in financial variables. Specifically, these shocks explain 23% of the variation
in debt, almost zero percent of the variation in bank net worth, nearly 2% of the variation in leverage ratio and
credit spreads.
5The leverage ratio is defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total shareholders’ equity. Throughout the paper, I use the
terms “bank net worth”, “bank capital”, or “bank equity” interchangeably, while I use the terms “bank liabilities” or “bank debt”
interchangeably.
6Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Meh and Moran (2010), Mendoza and Quadrini (2010), and
Curdia and Woodford (2010)
7The current paper is not the only paper that introduce net worth shocks. Meh and Moran (2010) consider shocks that
originate within the banking sector and produce sudden shortages in bank capital. They suggest that these shocks reflect periods
of financial distress and weakness in financial markets. Moreover, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) introduce shocks to bank
capital and interpret them as independent shocks arising from other activities like investment banking. They give as an example
that Bear Stearns’ clients terminated their brokerage relationships and ran on the investment bank in March 2008. Curdia and
Woodford (2010) introduce exogenous increases in the fraction of loans that are not repaid and exogenous increases in real financial
intermediation costs, both of which reduce net worth of financial intermediaries exogenously. Mendoza and Quadrini (2010) study
the effect of net worth shocks on asset prices and interpret these shocks as unexpected loan losses due to producers’ default on
their debt. These shocks can be also attributed to the fluctuations in non-financial sector’s equity holdings as banks’ balance sheets
include a non-trivial share of corporate equity. Finally, one might model this shock as a redistribution shock such that some portion
of the wealth is transferred from financial intermediaries to households as suggested by Iacoviello (2010). Although the negative
wealth transfer may distort the financial intermediaries’ role of allocating resources inducing large real effects, the positive and
negative wealth effects are likely to eliminate each other since households own financial intermediaries in the context of our model,
which in turn implies that the impact of this shock on aggregate demand will not be very different from the net worth shock in our
model.
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This paper is related to recent empirical and theoretical literature on the role of financial intermediaries on
business cycles. On the empirical side, the stylized facts about the financial variables documented in this paper
are not widely known in the macro literature. To the best of my knowledge, the only related work is Adrian and
Shin (2008, 2009), who provide evidence on the time series behavior of balance sheet items of some financial
intermediaries using Flows of Funds data. However, they do not present standard business cycle statistics of
financial variables.8 They also argue that to the extent that balance sheet fluctuations affect the supply of credit,
they have the potential to explain real fluctuations and they empirically show that bank equity have significant
forecasting power for total GDP growth. On the other hand, there are several papers documenting the behavior
of the liabilities and equity of U.S non-financial corporate sector and a few papers providing empirical facts on
the leverage ratio of the financial sector.9 The closest available study is Chugh (2010), who computes standard
business cycle statistics of the leverage ratio of U.S. non-financial firms using quarterly data from Compustat.10
Gilchrist, Yankov and Zakrajsek (2009) empirically shows that credit market shocks, which can result from
deterioration in the supply of credit due to weak balance sheets of firms or the disruptions in the health of banks
that supply credit, have played an important role for U.S. business cycle fluctuations during 1990-2008 period
and account for more than 30% of the variation in economic activity measured by industrial production. In this
paper, I focus on the effect of balance sheet fluctuations in financial sector on macroeconomic fluctuations.
On the theoretical side, the current paper differs from the existing literature on financial accelerator effects
arising from the movements in the strength of borrowers’ balance sheets.11 This literature focused on the
demand for credit. However, this paper focuses on supply of credit and features financial accelerator effects
driven by fluctuations in the strength of lenders’ balance sheets. Two other closely related works to this paper
are Meh and Moran (2010), and Angeloni and Faia (2010). The former investigates the role of bank capital in
transmission of technology, bank capital and monetary policy shocks in a medium-scale New Keynesian, double
moral hazard framework. The latter studies the role of banks in the interaction between monetary policy and
macroprudential regulations in a New Keynesian model with bank runs. Finally, this paper is different from
GK and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) – henceforth, GNK. They focus on the normative implications of central
bank’s credit policy in a Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) -type New Keynesian model with banks.
However, in this paper, I address the positive implications of shocks to bank capital and the agency problem
between households and banks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, I document evidence on the real and financial fluc-
tuations in U.S. data. Section 3 describes the theoretical model. Section 4 presents the model parametrization
and calibration together with the quantitative results of the model. Section 5 concludes.
2. Real and Financial Fluctuations
This section documents stylized facts on aggregate measures of the leverage ratio, debt and equity of U.S.
financial firms and the credit spread using quarterly data for the period 1952-2009.12 In particular, I compute
standard business cycle statistics of the aggregate financial variables, such as standard deviations, and cross-
correlations with standard macro variables.
8They define leverage as the ratio of total assets to total equity. Moreover, their notion of “procyclical” is not with respect to
GDP, but with respect to total assets of financial intermediaries. The notion of “procyclical” in the current paper is more standard
in the sense that it is with respect to GDP. Hence, I undertake a more standard macro business cycle accounting exercise. In
addition, they do not analyze the whole financial sector, as they omit bank holding companies, finance companies and insurance
companies.
9Covas and den Haan (2006), and Jermann and Quadrini (2009) discuss non-financial firms, while Levin, Natalucci, and Zakrajsek
(2004), and Korajczyk and Levy (2003) discuss the leverage ratio of the financial sector.
10He also studies the role of risk shocks in generating the observed real and financial fluctuations in a Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1998) type financial accelerator model.
11Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)
12I perform the same business cycle analysis for the period 1984-2009, with results available upon request. Briefly, the volatilities
of aggregate financial variables and credit spread are roughly the same compared to 1952-2009. Debt is strongly procyclical, and
leverage ratio is mildly procyclical while equity is acyclical in this period. Credit spread is still countercyclical.
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I use quarterly balance sheet data from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve Board. The
balance sheet data in the levels tables at the Flow of Funds Accounts are not seasonally adjusted and are
nominal. I perform the seasonal adjustment using Census X12 and deflated the series using GDP deflator.
Moreover, the balance sheet items at the Flow of Funds Accounts are market-value based. For credit spread, I
use quarterly data from FRED.
I focus on both depository and non-depository financial institutions. The depository institutions are U.S.
chartered commercial banks, savings institutions, and credit unions. The non-depository institutions are issuers
of asset-backed securities, bank holding companies, security brokers and dealers, finance companies, insurance
companies, funding corporations, and real estate investment trusts. These institutions perform the majority
of activity in the U.S. financial sector as measured by their total assets.13 The debt measure I use is total
liabilities, while the equity measure is total shareholder’s equity. For each quarter, I compute the aggregate
leverage ratio as the ratio of the aggregate liabilities of aforementioned financial institutions to their aggregate
shareholders’ equity. Finally, the spread measure I use the high yield bond spread computed as the difference
between interest rate on Baa rated bonds and that on Aaa rated bonds.14
Figure 1 displays the time series of the aggregate leverage ratio of financial firms together with its HP trend
component. The mean leverage ratio over the sample period is 13.68. The leverage ratio trends upward until
1988 and then falls down until the present. Note that the de-leveraging in the recent financial crisis is consistent
with the longer term trend since 1988. In addition, the downward trend in the leverage ratio starting from 1988
is due to implementation of Basel Accord on capital requirements of banks.
Figure 2 shows the HP-filtered cyclical components of aggregate financial variables with NBER recession
dates. Top-left panel of Figure 2 displays the cyclical components of aggregate leverage ratio. There are several
sharp spikes evident in this figure: in 1974, in 1982, in 1991, in 1999 and 2000, and in 2006 and 2007. All
of these spikes are associated with known economic and financial crises. The 1982 spike corresponds to Latin
American debt crisis beginning in Mexico in 1982. The 1991 spike is associated with the Savings and Loan crisis
in the U.S. between 1989 and 1991 and the burst of Japanese asset price bubble in 1990. The 1999 and 2000
episode is associated with the expansion and bursting of the tech bubble, while the final episode in 2006 and
2007 is due to recent global financial crisis preceded by the substantial leveraging before the crisis. Therefore,
I can say that leverage cycles in U.S. financial sector are apparent and associated with major crises observed
after 1952.
Top-right and bottom-left panels of Figure 2 display the cyclical components of aggregate liabilities and
aggregate equity. The fluctuations in aggregate equity are much larger than those in aggregate liabilities.
The quarterly standard deviation of aggregate equity is 5.76 % compared to 2.16% for aggregate liabilities.
In addition, if we compare the top-left and bottom-left panels of Figure 2, we can observe that movements
in the leverage ratio of U.S. financial firms are mainly due to fluctuations in their aggregate equity. The
contemporaneous correlation between the leverage ratio and aggregate equity is -0.92. Finally, bottom-right
panel of Figure 2 shows the cyclical component of credit spread. The fluctuations in credit spread is an order of
magnitude larger than those in output. The quarterly standard deviation of credit spread is 21.70% compared
to 1.97% for GDP.
Table 1 presents business cycle statistics for the aggregate leverage ratio, aggregate liabilities, and aggregate
equity of U.S. financial sector together with those for the credit spread. The volatility of the leverage ratio is
nearly 3 times larger than that of output and is roughly equal to that of investment. Table 1 shows that the
financial leverage ratio is acyclical. The contemporaneous correlation between the financial leverage ratio and
output is -0.08. The volatility of aggregate equity is 3 times larger than that of output, while the volatility
13The total assets of these institutions is 90% of the total assets of the U.S. financial sector. Moreover, our definition of U.S.
financial sector includes important marked based financial institutions such as security broker&dealers, finance companies, asset
backed security (ABS) issuers, and commercial banks as Adrian and Shin (2009) suggest. They argue that the balance sheet
fluctuations of these institutions are important determinants of real fluctuations.
14I choose the high yield bond spread among several different measures of credit spread since it is widely accepted that this bond
spread is more reflective of default risk than other credit spreads and that it has a stronger forecasting power for real economic
activity. Furthermore, I could also use the difference between 3-month commercial paper rate on financial firms and 3-month T-bill
rate as a measure of credit spread, however, the longest available data on 3-month commercial paper rate is from 1997 to 2010.
4
of aggregate debt is roughly equal to that of output.15 The contemporaneous correlation between aggregate
liabilities and output is 0.57 while that between aggregate equity and output is 0.28, indicating that both series
are procyclical.16 Moreover, the credit spread is ten times more volatile than output and the contemporaneous
correlation with GDP is -0.56, showing that it is countercyclical.
Table 2 displays the cross-correlations of financial variables with different lags and leads of GDP. It shows that
aggregate financial variables lead business cycles in the U.S. In particular, the financial leverage ratio, equity and
credit spread lead output by three, two and one quarters, respectively. However, liabilities contemporaneously
move with output.
The following facts emerge from the empirical analysis above: (1) Financial leverage ratio and equity are
three times more volatile than output, liabilities are roughly as volatile as output, and credit spread is an order
of magnitude more volatile, and (2) liabilities and equity are procyclical, financial leverage ratio is acyclical, and
credit spread is countercyclical. (3) Financial leverage ratio, equity and credit spread lead output by three, two
and one quarters, respectively, while liabilities contemporaneously move with output. I will assess the model
below by its ability to match these facts.
3. A Business Cycle Model with Financial Sector
The model builds on GK and GNK. The economy consists of four types of agents: households, financial
intermediaries, firms, and capital producers. The ability of financial intermediaries to borrow from households
is limited due to a moral hazard (costly enforcement) problem, which will be described below. Firms acquire
capital in each period by selling shares to financial intermediaries. Finally, capital producers are incorporated
into the model in order to introduce capital adjustment costs in a tractable way. Table 3 shows the sequence of
events in a given time period in the theoretical model described below.
3.1. Households
There is a continuum of identical households of measure unity. Households are infinitely-lived with prefer-
ences over consumption (ct) and leisure (1− Lt) given by
∞∑
t=0
βtU(ct, 1− Lt) (1)
Each household consumes and supplies labor to firms at the market clearing real wage wt. In addition, they
save by holding deposits at a riskless real return rt at competitive financial intermediaries.
There are two types of members within each household: workers and bankers. Workers supply labor and
return the wages they earn to the household while each banker administers a financial intermediary and transfers
any earnings back to the household. Hence, the household owns the financial intermediaries that its bankers
administer. However, the deposits that the household holds are put in financial intermediaries that it doesn’t
own.17 Moreover, there is perfect consumption insurance within each household.
At any point in time the fraction 1−ζ of the household members are workers and the remaining fraction ζ are
bankers. An individual household member can switch randomly between these two jobs over time. A banker this
period remains a banker next period with probability θ, which is independent of the banker’s history. Therefore,
the average survival time for a banker in any given period is 1/(1 − θ). The bankers are not infinitely-lived in
order to make sure that they don’t reach a point where they can finance all equity investment from their own net
15Using the Flow of Funds database, Jermann and Quadrini (2009) shows that relative volatilities of non-financial sector debt
and equity to nonfinancial business sector GDP are 1.29 and 1.05, respectively.
16Jermann and Quadrini (2009) find that debt is countercyclical and equity is procyclical for non-financial firms for the same time
period. In addition, using Compustat database, Covas and Den Haan (2006) shows that debt and equity issuance is procyclical for
the majority of publicly listed firms.
17This assumption ensures independent decision-making. Depositors are not the owners of the bank, so the bank does not
maximize their utility, but its own net worth.
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worth. Hence, every period (1− θ)ζ bankers exit and become workers while the same mass of workers randomly
become bankers, keeping the relative proportion of workers and bankers constant. Period t bankers learn about
survival and exit at the beginning of period t + 1. Bankers who exit from the financial sector transfer their
accumulated earnings to their respective household. Furthermore, the household provides its new bankers with
some start-up funds.18
The household budget constraint is given by
ct + bt+1 = wtLt + (1 + rt)bt +Πt (2)
The household’s subjective discount factor is β ∈ (0,1), ct denotes the household’s consumption, bt+1 is the
total amount of deposits that the household gives to the financial intermediary, rt is the non-contingent real
return on the deposits from t − 1 to t, wt is the real wage rate, and Πt is the profits to the household from
owning firms, capital producers and banks net of the transfer that it gives to its new bankers.
The household chooses ct, Lt, and bt+1 to maximize (1) subject to the sequence of flow budget constraints
in (2). The resulting first order conditions for labor supply and deposit holdings are given by
Ul(t)
Uc(t)
= wt (3)
Uc(t) = β(1 + rt+1)EtUc(t+ 1) (4)
The first condition states that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is equal
to the wage rate. The second condition is the standard consumption-savings Euler equation, which equates the
marginal cost of not consuming and saving today to the expected discounted marginal benefit of consuming
tomorrow.
3.2. Financial Intermediaries
3.2.1. Balance Sheets
Financial intermediaries transfer the funds that they obtain from households to firms. The balance sheet
identity of financial intermediary j at the end of period t is given by
qtsjt = ωtn˜jt + bjt+1 (5)
where n˜jt is the net worth of financial firm j at the beginning of period t before the net worth shock hits, bjt+1 is
the amount of deposits that the intermediary obtains from the households, qt is the price of firms’ shares and sjt
is the quantity of these shares. Banks undertake equity investment and firms finance their capital expenditures
by issuing shares. Therefore, the financial contract between the intermediary and the firm is an equity contract
(or equivalently a state-dependent debt contract).
ωt is an i.i.d. net worth shock that I introduce into the model to capture exogenous movements in the net
worth of financial intermediaries.19 Therefore, ωtn˜jt is the effective net worth of the financial intermediary. For
notational convenience, I denote ωtn˜jt by njt. Hence, njt is the net worth of financial firm j at the beginning of
period t after the net worth shock hits. Furthermore, even though the net worth shock is i.i.d., it endogenously
persists through its effect on net worth accumulation.20
The households put their deposits into the financial intermediary at time t and obtain the non-contingent real
return rt+1 at t+1. Therefore, bjt is the liabilities of the financial intermediary and njt is its equity or capital.
21
18This assumption ensures that banks don’t have zero net worth in any period and is similar to the one about the entrepreneurial
wage in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999).
19I model this shock as an i.i.d. process because I assume that financial intermediaries immediately write off their losses in a
given period when they realize it.
20This view is consistent with Woodford (2010). His paper suggests that if a shock induces a decrease (or increase) in the net
worth of financial intermediaries, this new level of net worth persists for a while, resulting in real effects that are more persistent
than the initial shock.
21In U.S. financial data, household deposits constitute 70% of total liabilities of banks.
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The financial intermediaries receive state-contingent return, rkt+1 for their equity investment. The fact that
rkt+1 is potentially greater than rt+1 creates an incentive for bankers to engage in financial intermediation.
The financial intermediary’s net worth at the beginning of period t+1 (before the time t+1 net worth shock
hits) is given by the difference between the earnings on equity investment in firms (assets of financial interme-
diary) and interest payments on deposits obtained from the households (liabilities of financial intermediary).
Thus the law of motion for the bank net worth is given by
n˜jt+1 = (1 + rkt+1)qtsjt − (1 + rt+1)bjt+1 (6)
Using the balance sheet of the financial firm given by (5), we can re-write (6) as follows:
n˜jt+1 = (rkt+1 − rt+1)qtsjt + (1 + rt+1)njt (7)
The financial intermediary’s net worth at time t+1 depends on the premium rkt+1−rt+1 that it earns on shares
purchased as well as the total value of these shares, qtsjt.
The profits of the financial intermediary will be affected by the premium given above. That is, the banker
will not have any incentive to buy firms’ shares if the return on these shares is less than the cost of deposits.
Thus the financial firm will continue to operate in period t+ i if the following inequality is satisfied:
Et+iβΛt,t+1+i(rkt+1+i − rt+1+i) ≥ 0 ∨ i ≥ 0 (8)
where βΛt,t+1+i is the stochastic discount factor that the financial firm applies to its earnings at t+1+ i. The
moral hazard problem between households and banks described below limits banks’ ability to obtain deposits
from the households, leading to a positive premium.
3.2.2. Profit Maximization
This section describes banks’ profit maximization. The financial intermediary maximizes its expected dis-
counted terminal net worth, given by22
Vjt = max
sjt
Et
∞∑
i=0
(1− θ)θiβiΛt,t+1+i[(rkt+1+i − rt+1+i)qt+isjt+i] + (1 + rt+1+i)njt+i] (9)
Since the risk premium is positive in any period, the financial intermediary will always have an incentive to
buy firms’ shares. Obtaining additional funds (deposits) from the households is the only way to achieve this.
However, the agency problem described below introduces an endogenous borrowing constraint for banks, thus a
limit on the size of the financial intermediaries: At the end of the period, the financial intermediary may choose
to divert λ fraction of available funds from its shares of firms with no legal ramification and give them to the
household of which the banker is a member.23 Therefore, for the banks not to have an incentive to divert the
funds, the following incentive compatibility constraint must be satisfied at the end of period t: 24
Vjt ≥ λqtsjt (10)
22The detailed profit maximization problem of financial intermediaries is in Appendix A.
23If the financial intermediary diverts the funds, the assumed legal structure ensures that the households (depositors) are able
to force the intermediary to go bankrupt and may recover the remaining fraction 1 − λ of the assets. The depositors are not able
to get the remaining fraction λ of the funds since, by assumption, the cost of recovering these funds is too high. Furthermore, as
Christiano (2010) suggests, diverting funds is meant to say that bankers might not manage funds in the interest of depositors or
they might invest funds into risky projects which do not earn a high return for depositors but a high excess return for bankers
themselves (Bankers might invest λ fraction of funds into very risky projects, which could potentially go bankrupt and reduce
equilibrium return to depositors). Taking this into consideration, depositors put their money at banks up to a threshold level
beyond which if bankers make risky investments, they do this at their own risk. This threshold level of deposits can be thought
as if deposits expand beyond that level, banks would have an incentive to default. The market discipline prevents deposits from
expanding beyond the default threshold level and interest rate spreads reflect this fear of default although defaults are not observed
in equilibrium.
24The incentive constraint binds when the value of Kt+1 is decided at the end of period t.
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The left-hand side of (11) is the value of operating for the bank while the right-hand side is the gain from
diverting λ fraction of assets. The intuition for this constraint is that in order for the financial intermediary
not to divert the funds and for the households to put their deposits into the bank, the value of operating in
financial sector must be greater than or equal to the gain from diverting assets.
A financial intermediary’s objective is to maximize the expected return to its portfolio consisting of firms’
shares and its capital subject to the incentive compatibility constraint. Then its demand for shares is fully
determined by its net worth position, since as long as the expected return from the portfolio is strictly positive,
it will expand its lending (its size) until the incentive compatibility constraint binds.
3.2.3. Leverage Ratio and Net Worth Evolution
Proposition 1 The expected discounted terminal net worth of a bank can be expressed as the sum of expected
discounted total return to its equity investment into firms and expected discounted total return to its existing net
worth.
Proof : See Appendix 7.1
Proposition 1 states that that Vjt can be expressed as follows:
Vjt = νtqtsjt + ηtnjt (11)
where
νt = Et[(1− θ)βΛt,t+1(rkt+1 − rt+1) + βΛt,t+1θ
qt+1sjt+1
qtsjt
νt+1] (12)
ηt = Et[(1− θ)βΛt,t+1(1 + rt+1) + βΛt,t+1θ
njt+1
njt
ηt+1] (13)
νt can be interpreted as the expected discounted marginal gain to the bank of obtaining one more unit of
deposits and using it to buy firms’ shares, holding its net worth njt constant. The first term is the discounted
value of the net return on shares to the bank if it exits the financial sector tomorrow. The second term is
the continuation value of its increased assets if it survives. Meanwhile, ηt can be interpreted as the expected
discounted marginal benefit of having one less unit of deposits and one more unit of net worth, holding qtsjt
constant. The first term is the discounted value of the return on net worth to the bank if it exits the financial
sector tomorrow. The second term is the continuation value of its increased net worth if it survives.
Therefore, we can write the incentive compatibility constraint as follows:
νtqtsjt + ηtnjt ≥ λqtsjt (14)
When this constraint binds, the financial intermediary’s assets are limited by its net worth.25 That is, if
this constraint binds, the funds that the intermediary can obtain from households will depend positively on its
equity capital:
qtsjt =
ηt
λ− νt
njt (15)
The constraint (16) limits the leverage of the financial intermediary to the point where its incentive to divert
funds is exactly balanced by its loss from doing so. Thus, the costly enforcement problem leads to an endogenous
borrowing constraint on the bank’s ability to acquire assets. When bank’s leverage ratio and/or bank equity is
high, it can purchase more shares of firms. Conversely, de-leveraging or the deterioration in net worth in bad
times will limit the bank’s ability to buy firms’ shares. Note that by manipulating this expression using the
balance sheet, I can obtain the bank’s leverage ratio as follows:
25As shown in Appendix A., the incentive compatibility constraint will bind as long as the risk premium rkt+1− rt+1 is positive.
In numerical simulations, I ensure that the risk premium is always positive.
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bjt+1
njt
=
ηt
λ− νt
− 1 (16)
The leverage ratio increases in the expected marginal benefit of obtaining one more unit of deposits and
using it to buy firms’ shares, and in the expected marginal gain of having one less unit of deposits and one more
unit of net worth. Intuitively, increases in ηt or νt mean that financial intermediation is expected to be more
lucrative going forward, which makes it less attractive to divert funds today and thus increases the amount of
funds depositors are willing to entrust to the financial intermediary.26
Using (16), I can re-write the law of motion for the banker’s net worth as follows:
n˜jt+1 = [(rkt+1 − rt+1)
ηt
λ− νt
+ (1 + rt+1)]njt (17)
The sensitivity of net worth of the financial intermediary j at t+1 to the ex-post realization of the premium
rkt+1 − rt+1 increases in the leverage ratio.
Proposition 2 Banks have an identical leverage ratio as none of its components depends on bank-specific factors.
Proof : From (17), one can obtain the following:
njt+1
njt
= [(rkt+1 − rt+1)
ηt
λ− νt
+ (1 + rt+1)] (18)
qt+1sjt+1
qtsjt
=
ηt+1
λ−νt+1
ηt
λ−νt
njt+1
njt
(19)
The expressions above show that banks have identical expected growth rates of assets and net worth, thus
have identical leverage ratios.27
By using Proposition 2, we can sum demand for assets across j to obtain the total intermediary demand for
assets:
qtst =
ηt
λ− νt
nt (20)
where st is the aggregate amount of assets held by financial intermediaries and nt is the aggregate intermediary
net worth. In the equilibrium of the model, movements in the leverage ratio of financial firms and/or in their
net worth will generate fluctuations in total intermediary assets.
The aggregate intermediary net worth at the beginning of period t+ 1 (before the net worth shock hits but
after exit and entry), n˜t+1, is the sum of the net worth of surviving financial intermediaries from the previous
period, n˜et+1, and the net worth of entering financial intermediaries, n˜nt+1. Thus, we have
n˜t+1 = n˜et+1 + n˜nt+1 (21)
Since the fraction θ of the financial intermediaries at time t will survive until time t + 1, their net worth,
n˜et+1, is given by
n˜et+1 = θ[(rkt+1 − rt+1)
ηt
λ− νt
+ (1 + rt+1)]nt (22)
26The amount of deposits at banks does directly depend on banks’ net worth. In good times banks’ net worth is relatively high
and depositors believe that bankers do not misbehave in terms of managing their funds properly. In these times, credit spreads can
be fully explained by observed bankruptcies and intermediation costs. However, in bad times, banks experience substantial declines
in their net worth and depositors are hesitant about putting their money in banks. In these times, the financial sector operates at
a less efficient level and a smaller number of investment projects are funded. Large credit spread observed in these times can be
explained by the above factors plus the inefficiency in the banking system.
27This immediately implies that ηt and νt are independent of j. In Appendix 7.1, I use this result in explicit derivation of ηt and
νt.
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Newly entering financial intermediaries receive start-up funds from their respective households. The start-up
funds are assumed to be a transfer equal to a fraction of the net worth of exiting bankers. The total final period
net worth of exiting bankers at time t is equal to (1 − θ)nt. The household is assumed to transfer the fraction
ǫ
(1−θ) of the total final period net worth to its newly entering financial intermediaries. Therefore, we have
n˜nt+1 = ǫnt (23)
Using (22), (23), and (24), we obtain the following law of motion for n˜t+1:
n˜t+1 = θ[(rkt+1 − rt+1)
ηt
λ− νt
+ (1 + rt+1)]nt + ǫnt (24)
3.3. Firms
There is a continuum of unit mass of firms that produce the final output in the economy. The production
technology at time t is described by the constant returns to scale function:
Yt = ztF (Kt, Ht) = ztK
α
t H
1−α
t (25)
where Kt is the firm’s capital stock, Ht is the firm’s hiring of labor and zt is an aggregate TFP realization.
Firms acquire capital Kt+1 at the end of period t to produce the final output in the next period. After
producing at time t+ 1, the firm can sell the capital on the open market.
Firms finance their capital expenditures in each period by issuing equities and selling them to financial
intermediaries. Firms issue st units of state-contingent claims (equity), which is equal to the number of units of
capital acquired Kt+1. The financial contract between a financial intermediary and a firm is an equity contract
(or equivalently, a state contingent debt contract). The firm pays a state-contingent interest rate equal to the
ex-post return on capital rkt+1 to the financial intermediary. The firms set their capital demand Kt+1 taking
this stochastic repayment into consideration. At the beginning of period t+ 1 (after shocks are realized), when
output becomes available, firms obtain resources Yt+1 and use them to make repayments to shareholders (or
financial intermediaries). The firm prices each financial claim at the price of a unit of capital, qt. Thus, we have
qtst = qtKt+1 (26)
There are no frictions for firms in obtaining funds from financial intermediaries. The bank has perfect
information about the firm and there is perfect enforcement. Therefore, in the current model, only banks face
endogenous borrowing constraints in obtaining funds. These constraints directly affect the supply of funds to
the firms.
Firms choose Kt+1 and Ht+1 in order to maximize their profits. The profit maximization problem solved by
a representative firm is given by
max
{Kt+1+jHt+j}∞j=0
Et
∞∑
j=0
βjΛt,t+j [zt+jF (Kt+j , Ht+j) + qt+j(1− δ)Kt+j − (1 + rkt+j)qt−1+jKt+j − wt+jHt+j ]
(27)
Profit maximization with respect to Kt and Ht gives us the following capital and labor demand conditions:
rkt+1 =
zt+1FK(Kt+1, Ht+1) + qt+1(1− δ)
qt
− 1 (28)
wt = ztFH(Kt, Ht) (29)
Condition (28) states that the real rate of return on capital is equal to the marginal product of capital plus
the capital gain from changed prices. Condition (29) states that the wage rate is equal to the marginal product
of labor.
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3.4. Capital Producers
Following the literature on financial accelerator, I incorporate capital producers into the model in order to
introduce capital adjustment costs in a tractable way. Capital adjustment costs are needed to introduce some
variation in the price of capital; otherwise the price of capital will not respond to the changes in capital stock
and will always be equal to 1.28
I assume that households own capital producers and receive any profits. At the end of period t, competitive
capital producers buy capital from firms to repair the depreciated capital and to build new capital. Then they
sell both the new and repaired capital. The cost of replacing the depreciated capital is unity; thus the price of a
unit of new capital or repaired capital is qt. The profit maximization problem of the capital producers is given
by:
max
It
qtKt+1 − qt(1− δ)Kt − It (30)
s.t. Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt +Φ
(
It
Kt
)
Kt (31)
where It) is the total investment by capital producing firms and Φ
(
It
Kt
)
is the capital adjustment cost function.
The resulting optimality condition gives the following “Q” relation for investment:
qt =
[
Φ
′
(
It
Kt
)]−1
(32)
where Φ
′
(
It
Kt
)
is the partial derivative of the capital adjustment cost function with respect to investment-capital
ratio at time t. The fluctuations in investment expenditures will create variation in the price of capital. A fall
in investment at time t (ceteris paribus) will reduce the price of capital in the same period.
3.5. Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium of this model economy consists of sequences of allocations {ct, Lt,Kt+1, st, nt, n˜t, It, ηt, νt,
Ht}
∞
t=0, of prices {wt, rkt, rt, qt}
∞
t=0 and of exogenous processes {zt, ωt}
∞
t=0 such that (i) the allocations solve the
household’s, the firm’s and the financial intermediary’s problems at the equilibrium prices and (ii) markets for
factor inputs clear. The following equilibrium conditions must be satisfied:
Ul(t)
Uc(t)
= wt (33)
Uc(t) = β(1 + rt+1)EtUc(t+ 1) (34)
rkt+1 =
zt+1FK(Kt+1, Ht+1) + qt+1(1− δ)
qt
− 1 (35)
wt = ztFH(Kt, Ht) (36)
nt = ωtn˜t (37)
qtst =
ηt
λ− νt
nt (38)
28There will be no financial accelerator between households and banks if there is no variation in the price of capital.
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νt = Et[(1 − θ)βΛt,t+1(rkt+1 − rt+1) + βΛt,t+1θ
qt+1st+1
qtst
νt+1] (39)
ηt = Et[(1− θ)βΛt,t+1(1 + rt+1) + βΛt,t+1θ
nt+1
nt
ηt+1] (40)
n˜t+1 = θ[(rkt+1 − rt+1)
ηt
λ− νt
+ (1 + rt+1)]nt + ǫnt (41)
qtst = qtKt+1 (42)
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt +Φ
(
It
Kt
)
Kt (43)
qt =
[
Φ
′
(
It
Kt
)]−1
(44)
Lt = Ht (45)
Ct + It = ztF (Kt, Ht) (46)
log(zt+1) = ρzlog(zt) + ǫ
z
t+1 (47)
log(ωt+1) = ǫ
ω
t+1 (48)
4. Quantitative Analysis
This section studies the quantitative predictions of the model by examining the results of numerical simu-
lations of an economy calibrated to quarterly U.S. data. In order to investigate the dynamics of the model, I
compute a first-order approximation to the equilibrium conditions using the perturbation algorithm developed
by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004).
4.1. Functional Forms, Parametrization and Calibration
The quantitative analysis uses the following functional forms for preferences, production technology and
capital adjustment costs:29
U(c, 1− L) = log(c) + υ(1− L) (49)
F (K,H) = KαH1−α (50)
Φ
(
I
K
)
=
I
K
−
ϕ
2
[
I
K
− δ
]2
(51)
Table 4 lists the parameter values for the model economy. The preference and production parameters are
standard in business cycle literature. I take the quarterly discount factor, β as 0.99 to match the 4% U.S.
average annual real interest rate. I pick the relative utility weight of labor υ to fix hours worked in steady state
29I choose the functional form of the capital adjustment cost following Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), Gertler, Gilchrist,
and Natalucci (2007) etc.
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at one third of the available time, i.e. L = 0.33. The share of capital in the production function is set to 0.36
to match the labor share of income in the U.S. data. The capital adjustment cost parameter is taken so as to
match the relative volatility of investment to GDP in the U.S. data. The quarterly depreciation rate of capital
is set to 2.26% to match the average annual investment to capital ratio.
The non-standard parameters in our model are the financial sector parameters: the fraction of the revenues
that can be diverted, λ, the proportional transfer to newly entering bankers, ǫ, and the survival probability of
bankers, θ. I pick these parameters to match the following three targets: a steady-state interest rate spread of
97 basis points; a steady-state leverage ratio of 1.3, and an average survival time of 10 years for bankers.30 The
resulting values for λ, ǫ and θ are 0.3437, 0.0017 and 0.967, respectively.
Finally, turning to the shock processes, the calibration of productivity shocks is standard. I set the persistence
of TFP shocks to 0.95 as commonly used in the literature, i.e. ρz = 0.95, and I choose the standard deviation
of shocks to TFP such that the benchmark model driven by productivity and net worth shocks generates a
quarterly standard deviation of output equal to 1.97%, which is the volatility of GDP fluctuations over the past
58 years. The resulting value for σz is 0.0042. Furthermore, I assume that net worth shock, ωt is an i.i.d. shock:
log(ωt+1) = ǫ
ω
t+1 (52)
with ǫω ∼ N(0, σω). I choose the standard deviation of the shock, σω, such that in the benchmark model, the
standard deviation of the leverage ratio relative to that of output is equal to 2.70, which is the relative volatility
of the leverage ratio over the past 58 years.31 The resulting value for σω is 0.019.
Finally, I assume that productivity and net worth shocks are uncorrelated in the model since the theoretical
model described above already features an endogenous mechanism in which productivity shocks affect banks’
net worth and net worth shocks affect aggregate output.
4.2. Intermediary Capital and the Transmission of Shocks
I present the dynamics of the model in response to productivity and net worth shocks. The figures show the
percentage deviations of the variables from their steady state values unless otherwise is noted.
Figure 4 presents the impulse responses to a one-time, one-standard deviation negative shock to TFP. The
negative technology shock reduces the price of investment goods produced by capital producers, lowering the
value of firms’ shares. This makes purchase of their shares less profitable for banks, which can also be observed
from the fall in the expected marginal gain of increasing assets and the fall in the expected marginal benefit
of increasing net worth. Thus, banks have difficulty in obtaining deposits from households since their equity
investment becomes less attractive. This reduces the return to deposits, inducing countercyclical credit spreads.
In order to compensate the fall in their external financing, banks need to finance a larger share of their purchases
of equities from their net worth. This requires a fall in their leverage ratio. Hence, the model with productivity
shocks generates a procyclical leverage ratio. Because banks cannot adjust their net worth immediately and the
lower price of capital reduces the value of their net worth, their financing conditions tighten and bank lending in
the form of equity purchases falls dramatically, inducing aggregate investment to fall. This creates the feedback
loop of falling price of capital, deteriorating balance sheets of banks, and tightening financing conditions. Note
that the fall in the balance sheet size of the banking sector is not only due to the fall in asset prices (price of
capital) but also due to the fall in the quantity of risky asset holdings, namely firms’ shares. This additional
quantity adjustment increases the amplification effect of banks.
Figure 5 presents the impulse responses to a one-time, one-standard deviation negative shock to net worth.
The negative net worth shock immediately reduces the net worth of banks. In order to compensate the decline
in their internal financing, they need to finance a larger share of their purchases of equities from deposits. This
induces a rise in their leverage ratio. Hence, the model driven by net worth shocks generates a countercyclical
30The average survival time for bankers is taken from Gertler and Karadi (2010). Average interest rate spread is the historical
average of high yield bond spread (Baa-Aaa) from 1952 to 2009).
31Calibrating the model to match the relative volatility of leverage ratio is crucial in explaining the financial fluctuations in the
data.
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leverage ratio. Although they have to finance a greater fraction of their equity investment from deposits, their
ability to do so is impaired by the fall in their net worth. This is why total liabilities (or deposits) first rise
and then decline. Moreover, the fall in their net worth translates into a reduction in their equity investment
on firms. The decline in equity investment is dramatic because banks are highly leveraged. Since firms finance
their capital expenditures via equity purchases by intermediaries, they cut back their investment severely. The
drop in investment reduces the price of capital, which lowers banks’ net worth further. This generates the same
feedback cycle of financial accelerator as above. Since the sharp fall in investment means that the economy
eats up its capital, causing the rise in consumption. The expected marginal benefit of getting one more unit of
deposits and buying firms’ shares and the expected marginal gain of having one more unit of net worth rise as
the rise in credit spread dominates the fall in the price of capital, which generates the increase in the banks’
leverage ratios.
As apparent from Figures 4 and 5, both shocks affect both real and financial variables. However, net
worth shocks generate larger fluctuations in financial variables. The rise in the credit spread is an order of
magnitude higher in response to net worth shocks (10 basis points versus 2 basis points). The absolute change
in the leverage ratio is six times larger in response to net worth shocks (3% versus -0.5%). Furthermore, net
worth shocks induce sizeable fluctuations in real variables. The output falls by 0.5% after the net worth shock
hits, which is nearly the same in response to productivity shocks. The fall in investment is more pronounced
in response to net worth shocks (3% versus 2%). Moreover, net worth shocks create qualitatively different
responses in some real and financial variables. Consumption, bank leverage ratio, and bank liabilities surge in
response to negative net worth shocks while they shrink in response to negative productivity shocks.
4.3. Business Cycle Dynamics
This section presents numerical results from stochastic simulations of the economy with productivity and
net worth shocks. I simulate the economy 1000 times for 1232 periods each and discard the first 1000 periods in
each simulation so that each simulation has the same length as the data sample. I then compute the business
cycle statistics using the simulated series.
Table 5 presents business cycle statistics of real and financial variables for the model economies with (1) both
productivity and net worth shocks – henceforth, benchmark model, (2) only productivity shocks, and (3) only
net worth shocks. The third column of Table 5 indicates that the benchmark model quantitatively accounts for
almost all real and financial fluctuations in the data. Consumption is less volatile than output, investment is
more volatile than output, and all real variables are highly persistent. In addition, debt is roughly as volatile as
output, equity is two times more volatile than output, and credit spread is an order of magnitude more volatile
than output. Moreover, debt and equity are procyclical, leverage ratio is mildly countercyclical or acyclical, and
credit spread is countercyclical. Thus, I conclude that real and financial statistics produced by the benchmark
model are all inline with the data, which is one of the main results of the paper.
The fourth and the fifth columns of Table 5 indicate that the absence of either shock prevents the model
from explaining some important features of real and financial data. Productivity shocks can only explain 23%
of the variation in debt, almost zero percent of the variation in bank net worth, nearly 2% of the variation in
leverage ratio and credit spreads. This model overpredicts somewhat the observed degree of procyclicality in
debt, and even more so the leverage ratio. It also generates an acyclical credit spread, contrary to the data. On
the other hand, the model driven solely by net worth shocks creates strong countercyclicality in debt, leverage
ratio and credit spreads, and highly procyclical net worth, neither of which is inline with the data. This model
also generates counterfactual negative correlations between consumption and output, and consumption and
investment.
Tables 6 and 7 report variance decompositions of real and financial variables in response to productivity
and net worth shocks. In particular, it displays the percentage of variance of the k-step-ahead forecast error in
real and financial variables due to productivity and net worth shocks. Table 6 shows that productivity shocks
account for only small fractions of equity, leverage ratio and credit spread while accounting for a non-trivial
fraction of debt. Moreover, Table 7 indicates that net worth shocks induce sizeable fluctuations in real variables.
These shocks account for 29% of the fluctuations in output, 22% of the fluctuations in consumption, 72% of the
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fluctuations in investment, and 84% of the fluctuations in labor hours. The results suggest that the fluctuations
in bank net worth are an important source for business cycle fluctuations.
Asset prices play an important role in generating financial fluctuations in the data. In order to quantify the
importance of asset price movements for financial variables, I also solve the benchmark model with fixed asset
prices.32 Fixing the asset prices reduces the fluctuations in debt, equity, leverage ratio, and credit spreads by
12%, 13%, 19%, and 3.6 percentage points, respectively. This model also generates less procyclical debt, more
procyclical net worth, more countercyclical leverage ratio and credit spreads.
Figure 6 displays the performance of the model in terms of cross-correlations of financial variables with
5 period leads and lags of output. The cross-correlations of financial variables with GDP generated by the
model driven by productivity and net worth shocks are quite close to the data. This figure also suggests
that the absence of either shock prevents the model from explaining the observed lead-lag relationships of
financial variables. Overall, I conclude that the model’s predictions about the cyclicality of financial variables
are consistent with the data.
4.4. Cyclical Properties of Capital Adequacy Ratio and Policy Implications
I close by presenting empirical observations on capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of U.S. financial sector and
compares these observations with the model-generated CAR.33 Figure 7 shows the cyclical component of CAR
with NBER recession dates. The quarterly standard deviation of CAR is 4.92%, which is two and a half times
more volatile than output. Its correlation with GDP is 0.08, implying that it is acyclical or mildly procyclical
at best.
The benchmark model accounts for 61% of the variation in CAR. The contemporaneous correlation between
the CAR and output is 0.21, suggesting that it is mildly procyclical. Furthermore, productivity shocks explain
19% of the fluctuations in CAR. Its contemporaneous correlation with output is -0.91, implying that it is
strongly countercyclical, contrary to the data. The model driven solely by net worth shocks generates 58% of
the observed volatility of the CAR. Its contemporaneous correlation with output is 0.98, implying that it is
strongly procyclical, which is not inline with the data. Moreover, these results suggest that the cyclicality of the
CAR depends on the sector that the shock originates from and are inline with the findings in Meh and Moran
(2010). If the shock originates within financial sector, the CAR is strongly procyclical, while if it originates
within non-financial sector, the CAR is countercyclical. Furthermore, these findings imply some important
policy prescriptions about bank capital requirements. If the shock originates within the banking sector, banks
should accumulate extra capital stock in booms. Excess bank capital increases bank lending to non-financial
firms and these firms increase their demand for investment goods raising the asset prices. Higher assets prices
improves the banks’ balance sheets and break the feedback cycle. In addition, this result is consistent with recent
demand of developed and developing countries’ banks to mitigate their capital adequacy requirements, especially
Basel III criteria. However, if the shock originates within the production sector, banks should reduce their extra
capital stock in booms. This is the case because firms cannot find profitable investment opportunities due to
lower productivity and asset prices fall. This worsens the banks’ net worth. Hence, the capital requirements
should be tightened so that banks set aside more capital in order to improve their balance sheet conditions.
After the productivity shock mitigates and banks’ net worth improves, bank lending increases, breaking the
feedback loop.
5. Conclusion
This paper characterizes the cyclical behavior of aggregate financial variables of U.S. financial sector together
with those of credit spread. Using a DSGE model augmented with profit maximizing banks in which banks’ net
worth mitigates an agency problem between financial intermediaries and its depositors, I quantitatively show
32Capital adjustment cost parameter is set to zero so that asset prices are always equal to one. The quantitative results of that
model are not shown here, however they are available upon request.
33Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is defined as the ratio of bank equity to bank assets.
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that the model driven by productivity and net worth shocks accounts for almost all real and financial fluctuations
in the U.S. data. Net worth shocks are transmitted to the real economy through a purely financial channel: if
there were no financial frictions between households and banks, net worth shocks are not able to generate any
real fluctuations. The absence of either shock or the agency problem prevents the model from explaining the
observed dynamics of real and financial variables simultaneously. Moreover, net worth shocks induce sizeable
fluctuations in real variables. However, productivity shocks can only partially explain the fluctuations in financial
variables. Finally, the model driven by net worth shocks implies a policy prescription for banks in response to
financial shocks. If net worth shock hits the economy, the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is strongly procyclical,
meaning that banks should build up more capital when the economy is in a boom, consistent with Basel III
regime. These results suggest that the model in the current paper can be used for practical policy analysis.
In this paper, adverse macro shocks create an adverse feedback loop of falling asset prices, deteriorating
balance sheets and tightening borrowing constraints for financial intermediaries. Banks do not internalize
that changes in their net worth affect asset prices, which in turn determine the tightness of their borrowing
constraints. As Jeanne and Korinek (2009) suggest, they do not internalize their contribution to aggregate
volatility and take on excessive leverage inducing systemic externalities. The model can quantify the systemic
externalities originating from excessive borrowing of bankers. Moreover, the following normative question arises
in this environment: Which macroprudential regulations can be introduced to make the banks internalize the
systemic externalities? What is the optimal tax rate to impose on borrowing by financial intermediaries to
prevent them from taking on excessive leverage? For further research, in order to start thinking about how
macroprudential regulations can be implemented in an environment in which the financial sector is crucial for
business cycle fluctuations, I need a model capable of matching real and financial fluctuations simultaneously.
I think that the model proposed in this paper is quite successful in this dimension.
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Appendix A: Profit Maximization Problem of Banks
The profit maximization problem by a representative bank is given by
Vjt = max
sjt
Et
∑
i=0
(1 − θ)θiβiΛt,t+1+i[(rkt+1+i − rt+1+i)qt+isjt+i + (1 + rt+1+i)njt+i]
s.t. Vjt ≥ λqtsjt (µt)
where µt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the incentive compatibility constraint. The first order
conditions w.r.t. sjt and µt are given respectively by
(1 − θ)θβΛt,t+1(rkt+1 − rt+1)qt − µtλqt = 0 (53)
Vjt − λqtsjt = 0 (54)
From (53), we establish that µt is greater than zero as long as rkt+1 > rt+1. Since, by assumption,
βiΛt,t+i[(rkt+1+i − rt+1+i)] is greater than zero, the incentive compatibility constraint will hold with equal-
ity. Thus, we have
Vjt = λqtsjt (55)
Now, we will write Vjt in a recursive form to obtain the leverage ratio of financial intermediaries. Let’s define
the following variables:
νtqtsjt = Et
∑
i=0
(1− θ)θiβiΛt,t+1+i[(rkt+1+i − rt+1+i)qt+isjt+i] (56)
ηtnjt = Et
∑
i=0
(1− θ)θiβiΛt,t+1+i(1 + rt+1+i)njt+i (57)
Thus, we have the following expression:
Vjt = νtqtsjt + ηtnjt (58)
Now we need to write νt and ηt recursively in order to get rid of infinite sums. Let’s begin with νt. To ease
the notation, let’s drop expectations for now.
νt =
∑
i=0
(1 − θ)θiβiΛt,t+1+i [(rkt+1+i − rt+1+i)xt,t+i] (59)
where xt,t+i =
qt+isjt+i
qtsjt
.
νt = (1 − θ)Λt,t+1(rkt+1 − rt+1) +
∑
i=1
(1− θ)θiβiΛt,t+1+i [(rkt+1+i − rt+1+i)xt,t+i] (60)
νt = (1− θ)Λt,t+1(rkt+1 − rt+1) + βΛt,t+1θxt,t+1
∑
i=1
(1− θ)θi−1βi−1Λt+1,t+i [(rkt+1+i − rt+1+i)xt+1,t+i] (61)
By updating equation (59) one period, we obtain the following expression for νt+1
νt+1 =
∑
i=0
(1 − θ)θiβiΛt+1,t+i [(rkt+1+i − rt+1+i)xt+1,t+i] (62)
where xt+1,t+i =
qt+isjt+i
qt+1sjt+1
.
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We can write (62) in the following way:
νt+1 =
∑
i=1
(1 − θ)θi−1βi−1Λt+1,t+i [(rkt+1+i − rt+1+i)xt+1,t+i] (63)
Thus, (63) is equal to the expression in the second term of RHS of equation (61). Hence, we can re-write
(61) with the expectations as follows:
νt = Et[(1 − θ)Λt,t+1(rkt+1 − rt+1) + βΛt,t+1θxt,t+1νt+1] (64)
Let’s continue with ηt. To ease the notation, let’s drop expectations for now.
ηt =
∑
i=0
(1− θ)θiβiΛt,t+i(1 + rt+1+i)zt,t+i (65)
where zt,t+i =
njt+i
njt
ηt = (1− θ)Λt,t+1(1 + rt+1) +
∑
i=1
(1 − θ)θiβiΛt,t+i(1 + rt+1+i)zt,t+i (66)
ηt = (1− θ)Λt,t+1(1 + rt+1) + βΛt,t+1θzt,t+1
∑
i=1
(1− θ)θi−1βi−1Λt+1,t+i(1 + rt+1+i)zt+1,t+i (67)
By updating equation (65) one period, we obtain the following expression for ηt+1
ηt+1 =
∑
i=0
(1− θ)θiβiΛt+1,t+i(1 + rt+1+i)zt+1,t+i (68)
where zt+1,t+i =
njt+i
njt+1
We can write (68) in the following way:
ηt+1 =
∑
i=1
(1− θ)θi−1βi−1Λt+1,t+i(1 + rt+1+i)zt+1,t+i (69)
Thus, (69) is equal to the expression in the second term of RHS of equation (51). Hence, we can re-write
(67) with the expectations as follows:
ηt = Et[(1− θ)Λt,t+1(1 + rt+1) + βΛt,t+1θzt,t+1ηt+1] (70)
When the incentive constraint binds, we have
νtqtsjt + ηtnjt = λqtsjt (71)
qtsjt =
ηt
λ− νt
njt (72)
By manipulating this expression using the balance sheet of financial firm, we can obtain the leverage ratio
of financial firms as follows:
bjt+1 + njt =
ηt
λ− νt
njt (73)
bjt+1 + njt
njt
=
ηt
λ− νt
(74)
bjt+1
njt
=
ηt
λ− νt
− 1 (75)
Therefore, ηt
λ−νt
- 1 is the leverage ratio of the financial sector.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Business Cycle Statistics, Quarterly U.S. Data, 1952-2009
GDP C I Leverage R. Debt Equity Spread
Standard deviation (%) 1.97 0.89 5.56 5.33 2.16 5.76 21.70
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.83 0.86 0.82 0.74 0.92 0.79 0.75
GDP 1 0.54 0.96 -0.08 0.57 0.28 -0.56
C – 1 0.29 0.10 0.07 -0.08 -0.05
Correlation matrix I – – 1 -0.10 0.63 0.33 -0.62
Leverage R. – – – 1 -0.03 -0.92 0.14
Debt – – – – 1 0.40 -0.51
Equity – – – – – 1 -0.32
Spread – – – – – 1
a Business cycle statistics for GDP, consumption and investment are computed using quarterly data from FRED database.
Consumption is the sum of personal consumption expenditures on nondurables and services (PCND + PCESV). Investment is
the sum of personal consumption expenditures on durable goods and gross private domestic investment (PCDG + GPDI). GDP
is the sum of consumption and investment.
b Business cycle statistics in the table are based on HP-filtered cyclical components over the period 1952-2009.
c The correlation coefficients greater than 0.13 are statistically significant at 5% significance level.
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Table 2: Cross Correlations of Financial Variables with Lags and Leads of GDP
Variable Yt−5 Yt−4 Yt−3 Yt−2 Yt−1 Yt Yt+1 Yt+2 Yt+3 Yt+4 Yt+5
LeverageR. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.08 -0.14 -0.18 -0.18 -0.10 0.00
Debt 0.01 0.13 0.27 0.41 0.52 0.57 0.57 0.50 0.39 0.26 0.12
Equity 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.21 0.28 0.34 0.35 0.31 0.20 0.05
Spread 0.28 0.17 0.03 -0.15 -0.34 -0.56 -0.67 -0.60 -0.46 -0.29 -0.11
a See the footnote (b) in Table 2 for the construction of aggregate financial variables.
b Business cycle statistics in the table are based on HP-filtered cyclical components over the period 1952-2009.
c The correlation coefficients greater than 0.13 are statistically significant at 5% significance level.
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Table 3: The Sequence of Events in a Given Time Period
1. Aggregate productivity shock zt is realized.
2. Firms hire labor Ht and production for period t takes place, Yt = ztF(Kt, Ht).
3. Firms make their wage payments wtHt and dividend payments to shareholders (banks) from period t-1.
4. Banks make their interest payments on deposits of households from period t-1 and bankers exit with probability (1-θ).
5. Net worth shock ωt is realized.
6. Households make their consumption and saving decisions and deposit their resources at banks.
7. Firms sell their depreciated capital to capital producers. These agents make investment and produce new capital Kt+1.
8. Firms issue shares [st = Kt+1] and sell these shares to banks to finance their capital expenditures.
9. Banks purchase firms’ shares and their incentive constraints bind.
10. Firms purchase capital Kt+1 from capital producers at the price of qt with borrowed funds.
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Table 4: Model Parameterization and Calibration
Description Parameter Value Target Data Moment
Preferences
Quarterly discount factor β 0.99 Annual T-bill rate (inflation adjusted) 4% 4%
Relative utility weight of leisure υ 2.4375 Hours worked 0.33 0.33
Production Technology
Share of capital in output α 0.36 Labor share of output 0.64 0.64
Capital adjustment cost parameter ϕ 3.7 Relative volatility of investment to GDP 2.82 2.82
Depreciation rate of capital δ 0.026 Average annual ratio of investment to capital 9.35% 9.35%
Steady-state total factor productivity z 1 Normalization N/A N/A
Financial Intermediaries
Steady-state fraction of assets that can be diverted λ 0.3437 Average financial leverage ratio 1.3 1.3
Proportional transfer to the entering bankers ǫ 0.0017 Average high yield bond spread (Baa-Aaa) 0.97% 0.97%
Survival probability of the bankers θ 0.967 Average survival time of banks in years 10 10
Steady-state level of net worth shock ω 1 Normalization N/A N/A
Shock Processes
Persistence parameter of productivity shock ρz 0.95 Quarterly persistence of TFP 0.95 0.95
Standard deviation of productivity shock σz 0.0042 Quarterly standard dev. of output 1.97% 1.97%
Standard deviation of net worth shock σω 0.019 Relative volatility of leverage ratio to GDP 2.70 2.70
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Figure 1: Leverage ratio of U.S. financial firms, 1952-2009
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Table 5: Real and Financial Statistics
Statistic Data Benchmark Only Productivity Shocks Only Net Worth Shocks
σY 1.97 1.97
∗ 1.70 0.95
σC
σY
0.45 0.77 0.80 0.61
σI
σY
2.82 2.82∗ 1.87 4.76
σL
σY
0.88 0.62 0.30 1.17
ρY 0.83 0.94 0.95 0.89
ρC 0.86 0.95 0.96 0.90
ρI 0.82 0.85 0.88 0.83
ρL 0.76 0.83 0.84 0.82
ρY,I 0.96 0.82 0.91 0.92
ρY,C 0.54 0.72 0.93 -0.11
ρY,L 0.81 0.65 0.73 0.87
ρC,I 0.29 0.27 0.81 -0.48
σDebt
σY
1.10 1.21 1.08 1.51
σEquity
σY
2.92 2.11 0.48 4.28
σLeverageR.
σY
2.70 2.70∗ 0.96 5.35
σSpread
σY
11.01 10.01 1.80 23.13
ρDebt 0.92 0.91 0.97 0.82
ρEquity 0.79 0.90 0.99 0.90
ρLeverageR. 0.74 0.87 0.97 0.86
ρSpread 0.75 0.92 0.84 0.92
ρY,Debt 0.57 0.41 0.90 -0.65
ρY,Equity 0.28 0.50 0.15 0.99
ρY,LeverageR. -0.08 -0.20 0.91 -0.98
ρY,Spread -0.56 -0.44 0.01 -0.94
a The numbers with ∗ are the calibration targets.
b The correlation coefficients greater than 0.13 are statistically significant at 5% significance level.
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Table 6: Percentage Variance Due to Productivity Shocks
4 Quarters 8 Quarters 12 Quarters 20 Quarters
Ahead Ahead Ahead Ahead
Output 71.60 72.85 74.34 76.20
Consumption 78.01 88.67 91.38 90.62
Investment 28.42 30.91 32.61 34.28
Hours 16.41 16.87 17.09 17.16
Debt 22.91 39.52 51.96 63.75
Equity 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Leverage R. 2.07 3.88 5.49 7.43
Credit Spread 2.14 1.32 1.26 1.48
Table 7: Percentage Variance Due to Net Worth Shocks
4 Quarters 8 Quarters 12 Quarters 20 Quarters
Ahead Ahead Ahead Ahead
Output 28.40 27.15 25.66 23.80
Consumption 21.99 11.33 8.62 9.38
Investment 71.58 69.09 67.39 65.72
Hours 83.59 83.13 82.91 82.84
Debt 77.09 60.48 48.04 36.25
Equity 99.98 99.98 99.98 99.75
Leverage R. 97.93 96.12 94.51 92.57
Credit Spread 97.86 98.68 98.74 98.52
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Figure 2: Cyclical Components of GDP and Aggregate Financial Variables, 1952-2009
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to a negative one-standard-deviation productivity shock
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to a negative one-standard-deviation net worth shock
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Figure 5: Cross-correlations between GDP and aggregate financial variables
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Figure 6: Cyclical Component of Capital Adequacy Ratio of U.S. Financial Sector, 1952-2009
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